Colin’s research ranges primarily over two areas: epistemology and the philosophy of religion. In epistemology, he’s interested in what kinds of reasons one must possess in order to be rationally justified in holding a belief, and what the structure of those reasons must be. In the philosophy of religion, he works mainly on arguments about the nature and existence of God. His current work focuses on debunking arguments as they arise in epistemology, the philosophy of religion, and the philosophy of mathematics. In addition to his teaching at Corpus Christ College, Colin is Chair of Philosophy at Kwantlen Polytechnic University.
Outside of philosophy, Colin is a lifelong vert skateboarder and surfer.
Philosophy
PhD
Editor of Christian Philosophy of Religion: Essays in Honor of Stephen T. Davis (2015, The University of Notre Dame Press.)
Editor (with Peter Horban) of Contemporary Arguments in Natural Theology: God and Rational Belief (2022, Bloomsbury.)
“The X-Claim Debunking Argument and Theistic Mooreanism” Philosophia Christi. Vol. 25. No.1 (2023), 61-75
“Theism, Explanation, and Mathematical Platonism” Philosophia Christi. Vol. 22. No. 2 (2020), 325-334
“Retributive Justice” (with Patrick Findler) in Think 21 (60): 57-64. 2022
“Propositional Platonism, Representation, and Divine Conceptualism”, in The European Journal for the Philosophy of Religion Vol. 8. No 4. (2016), 195-212
“A Note on Mind-Dependence” in Philo: A Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 17. No. 1 (2014), 92-98
“Swinburne on Basing and Deviant Inferential Pathways,” in Acta Analytica: International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition Vol. 30. No. 1. (2015), 87-95.
“Divine Thoughts and Fregean Propositional Realism,” in International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion Vol. 76. No. 2. (2014) 2014, 41-51.
“Epistemic Supervenience and Internalism: A Trilemma,” in Theoria: The Swedish Journal of Philosophy Vol. 75, No.2 (2009), 129-151.
“Modal Stability, and Warrant,” in Philosophia Vol. 34, No. 2 (2006), 173-188.
“Plantinga’s S5 Modal Argument, Obvious Entailment, and Circularity: Response to Sennett,” in Philo: A Journal of Philosophy Vol. 7, No. 2 (2004), 71-78.
“Evidentialism, Warrant, and the Division of Epistemic Labor,” in Philosophia Vol. 31, Nos. 1-2 (2003), 185-203.
“Some Remarks on BonJour on Warrant, Proper Function, and Defeasibility,” in Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology Vol. 4, No. 2 (2000), 215-228.
The Canadian Philosophical Society, The American Philosophical Association